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ABORIGINAL TITLE: TRAVELLING FROM (OR TO?)
AN ANTIQUE LAND?
P.G. MCHUGH t
I met a traveller from an antique land,
Who said, "Two vast and trunkless legs ofstone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Halfsunk, a shattered visage lies, whosefown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer ofcold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lfeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal these words appear:
'My name is Ozymandias, King ofKings,
Look on my works ye Mighty, and despair!'
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Ofthat Colossal Wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away."
[Percy Bysshe Shelley, "Ozymandias"]'
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1. TESTING TIME
This brief comment is about time and its involvement with the Canadian
jurisprudence of Aboriginal title. It starts from a simple proposition so
basic it can be overlooked or factored out of thought processes even as
that activity is displaying this essential everyday quality: A human
community lives in time. All things human are subject to change,
including the way in which we conceive objects, rules, relationships,
traditions, and past events. Historicity-our communication of our
sense of living in time and the acknowledgement of the inherent
mutability of our world-is part of the human condition. Human life is
infused with temporality. All the things that human beings create,
materially or intellectually, even those carved like Ozymandias out of
marble in seeming defiance of the passage of time, can only be artifacts of
their time.
Time necessarily-unavoidably-attends the jurisprudence of First
Nations relations with the Crown (federal and provincial). As it is a
human construction, that jurisprudence is in a state of constant
development. A living jurisprudence is inevitably on a timeline that goes
into its future inherently unfinished and unfinishable. Its common-law
basis means that change will occur within the protocols and methods of
common-law thought as it has been received and practised on Canadian
soil. Of course, the dynamics of legal change in a common-law system are
shaped by the haphazard nature of litigation, its inductive fact-specific
setting, and the set of possibilities that legal language is able to
articulate-and thereby contest-at any moment in time. Legal change
is achieved through a way of thought and a form of disputation that, like
the rules this way of thinking articulates, is also prone to change. What
we think and how we think change. Legal doctrines and legal methods
change over time through processes, often irresolute, of contestation and
litigation, as well as through more subtle processes of education,
acculturation, intellectual rumination, conversation, and absorption of
technological change. Law lives within a political community and the
community lives in its law. It articulates that community's values,
priorities, and its own set of possibilities-not those that the community
(as a polity continuous in time and place) will be articulating a century
later, when that law will (through later lenses) be seen to have forms of
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incompleteness and inadequacy that do not strike or afflict that
community in the manner perceived 100 years on. Our present network
of laws is not our message to the future, but an expression of how we are
now. This much is obvious but needs statement.
Those who cannot accept as basic the statement that Crown officials
negotiating a treaty in the late 19th century could have no idea what the
Supreme Court would say about fiduciary duty in Guerin2 are in a world
of troublesome atemporality where the difference between now and a
century ago means nothing. The same applies to those who suggest that
lawyers in late-19th century Ontario should have advised clients (First
Nations included) on the basis that the minority and dissenting Supreme
Court judgments in St. Catharines Milling and Lumber were an
accurate description of the law as then understood in 1887. While the
Canadian jurisprudence has come to prefer those dissenting judgments,
the suggestion that the dissenters were seen as correct in 1887 is plainly
unsustainable. The present-day Canadian jurisprudence has applied its
argumentative technique to render a revisionist position towards
St. Catharines Milling that rehabilitates the dissenting judges. Our view
of what should then have been seen as the correct position (a present-day
legal observation), however, should not be mistaken for the
interpretation given that case and the status of the dissenting judgments
in the late 19th century (a historical observation).
In the same vein, 100 years from now courts and commentators will
almost certainly have a different handle on Tsilhqotin Nation5 than the
one expressed here. These future actors will have the advantage of
hindsight and a different jurisprudential vantage point, though that legal
positioning will still be carrying hallmarks (the likes of which we know
2 Guerin v R, [1984] 2 SCR 335, 59 BCLR 301 [Guerin].
St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co v R (1887), 13 SCR 577, 13 OAR 148
[St. Catharines Milling].
See Kent McNeil, "Indigenous Rights Litigation, Legal History, and the Role of
Experts" (2014) 77:2 Sask L Rev 173 at 180, n 35.
Tsilhqotin Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 256
[Tsilhqot'in Nation].
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not now) of our common-law thought as a continuous but dynamic
human activity. Nor for that matter were lawyers a hundred years ago
poised in bated breath and expectation of what Canadian courts would
be saying a century later, any more than we are now in clutching
excitement about the Supreme Court's utterances in 2114. It is one thing
to say the law has changed; it is another to say that it has always taken a
particular position, and in so doing, deny law's mutability as an
inherently human enterprise. Those who say the common law has 'always'
taken a particular position are erecting an Ozymandias, a statue of
seeming permanence that is a memorial to the product of their thought
and enterprise at a particular time.
Some years ago while south of the Medicine Line, Charles Wilkinson
wrote an influential book called American Indians, Time and the Law.6
Wilkinson looked at the 80 cases on federal Indian law since the United
States Supreme Court rendered Williams v Lee,7 a case he saw as marking
the jurisprudential outset of the modern era. Wilkinson concluded that
the corpus of modern case law showed that Indian tribes were part of
American society with a legal status that rested upon the early treaties,
agreements, and statutes that the United States had passed and acceded
to during the course of its constitutional identity practices. This earlier
body of legal instruments showed the tribes as "islands" of
self-government with a degree of insulation from time and space, within
which tribes were not simply societies caught in amber, but dynamic
ones that retained both distinctive elements of traditional Indian life
while adjusting to the outside world. Wilkinson's book caught the
tension between First Nations as traditional communities and
inhabitants of a modern world that has also pervaded the Canadian
jurisprudence. He did not, however, write as a historian or even an
historical geographer, but as a lawyer attempting to bring doctrinal
coherence to a body of case law. A perceptive reviewer of the book
analogized its approach with a horse carved from marble (an equine
6 Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a
Modern Constitutional Democracy (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1987).
Williams v Lee, 358 US 217,79 S Ct 269 (1959).
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Ozymandias), indicating that Wilkinson had used the 80 cases to isolate
enduring (and hence immutable) legal principles that the author was
arguing had "always" underpinned federal Indian law. This is a legal
exercise in the organization of cases into coherent doctrine, but it is
hardly a historical approach looking at the biography and sociology of
the jurisprudence as a living dynamic thing, noting its trends,
dispositions, wayward moods, and course of growth inside a political
community (or a series of them, straddled by a federal legal system). We
may laud Wilkinson's marble horse of law as an intellectual text
produced in a time and place representative of the politics surrounding
the deployment of federal Indian law in the mid-1980s, but it is not
history or a sociological biography of the jurisprudence. Wilkinson's
objet d'art has historicity in the same way as Shelley's Ozymandias
weathering in the desert as a monument and artifact of a civilization at a
particular juncture of its being. Wilkinson forges doctrine that purports
to speak enduringly but which, a quarter of a century later, seems a
timepiece of the era in which he wrote. Announcing itself as a
representation of enduring principle, its style defies temporality while
everywhere now showing its exposure to the forces of it.
Famously, Tsilhqot'in Nation represents the first occasion on which
Canadian courts have positively recognized an instance of common-law
Aboriginal title. In so doing and as such an important landmark, the case
raises issues of time and its passage in two senses that will be considered
in this commentary. These pick up on the themes I have set out above.
The first concerns the case's place in the short history of the modern
jurisprudence of First Nations law. Tsilhqotin Nation is certainly a
landmark in the pathway of this court-based jurisprudence, an era that
might be taken as having commenced with Calder v British Columbia in
1973.9 We do not know where that history will lead but we can see
Tsilhqot'in Nation in terms of the lie of the jurisprudence preceding it.
8 Fred L Ragsdale, Book Review of American Indians, Time, and the Law by Charles
Wilkinson, (1987) 27:3 Nat Resources J 764.
9 Calder et al v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313,
34 DLR (3d) 145 [Calder].
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Of course there may be debate over the mapping of this jurisprudence.
We must be clear that an attempt to carve a monument out of the cases
that comprise the corpus of this jurisprudence is an exercise in giving
present-day coherence and rationality to its totality. This is a legal
exercise to explicate doctrine, a version of what Blackstone, for example,
attempted in writing his Commentaries,o where he tried to coherently
organize the mass of common law in terms of Roman law principles for
an audience of his time." This "black letter" approach treats the case law
as accretive, as the building case by case of an ever-enlarging corpus of
precedent into which lawyers plunge to winnow, sift, and divine the
relevant law. A historical account, however, looks at the pathway of this
jurisprudence as a chronology with twists, passing and semipermanent
shapes (and misshapes), and turns (and U-turns) of its own. It looks at
the direction the legal dynamics have taken in a historical (rather than a
monumentalizing and totalizing) manner. So first, we can look at
Tsilhqot'in Nation as the latest installment in an ongoing jurisprudential
venture, a recent episode in a narrative of court involvement in
Crown-tribe relations that essentially began with Calder.
Secondly, I look at how the doctrine that this jurisprudence has
generated questions of time, particularly in the way that it has
constructed the test by which the juridical creature that is common-law
Aboriginal title is regarded as subsisting at law. These capture the
historical tension that has inhabited this law, and shaped (if not
disfigured) its development, the tension between First Nations as
modern and antique communities. The legal test for Aboriginal title is
configured by reference to the state of the title at two particular
moments: the present day and the date of Crown sovereignty. In the way
that it has been devised, this test raises questions about the juridical
function of Aboriginal title. This is a basic question that the Supreme
Io William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1765).
See David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in
Ezghteenth- Century Britain (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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Court seems in Tsilhqotin Nation-and since Delgamuukw12-to have
conspicuously avoided. To put it crudely, is Aboriginal title simply a
possessory action applicable to certain extant practices related to land?
Or is it also a legal device for the pursuit of historical claims against the
Crown? Should we conflate what common-law Aboriginal title is today
with what it was (or was not), say, a century ago? Is common-law
Aboriginal title a marble statue that stands monumentally through time
as a proud statement of enduring and immutable legal truths? Or is it a
living form of law that expresses both a community's values at a
particular time and that community's ever-evolving processes for the
legitimation of the exercise of public authority?
Commentators on the Tsilhqotin Nation case have raised other issues
of retroactivity perceived as being harboured in the judgment." The
Province appears not to have been too distracted by those possibilities, at
least so far, and has taken a "moving forward" position." Nonetheless the
irresolution of these possibilities raises questions about the role of
adjudication in the resolution of Aboriginal peoples' claims. This is
particularly the case where those claims are of a historical nature, and it is
to this I turn in the second part of this commentary on
Tsilhqot'in Nation.
12 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th)
193 [Delgamuukw].
13 See e.g. Tracy A Pratt & Neal J Smitheman, "Tsilhqot'in Nation Case: What It
Means for Resource Development in Ontario", Mining Markets (11 August 2014),
online: <www.miningmarkets.ca>. Attention has particularly focused upon
paragraph 92 of the Tsilhqot'in Nation judgment, supra note 5:
Once title is established, it may be necessary for the Crown to reassess prior conduct in light
of the new reality in order to faithfully discharge its fiduciary duty to the title-holding group
going forward. For example, if the Crown begins a project without consent prior to
Aboriginal title being established, it may be required to cancel the project upon
establishment of the title if continuation of the project would be unjustifiably infringing.
" "Province, First Nation Agree to Interim Rules for Land Won at Supreme Court",
The Globe andMail (13 March2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
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2. TSILHQOT'INNATION IN CONTEXT
How does Tsilhqotin Nation fit into the historical journey of the First
Nations' jurisprudence that essentially began with Calder? In my book
Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rzghts1 5 I
suggested that it was possible to see this jurisprudence as having been
through a series of phases. These are outlined in this section, with a
suggestion that the Supreme Court judgment has a context that in a key
respect echoes the setting of Calder.
Calder was essentially a judicial response to the failure of Canada's
political branches to achieve serious national commitment to addressing
land claims. In Calder the Supreme Court characterized the
longstanding principle of the non-justiciability of executive management
(derived from the historical difficulty of impleading the Crown) as an
outmoded relic of an older era, signaling that it was prepared to embark
upon the formation of a doctrinal frame for possessory claims against the
Crown. This willingness to use the common law therapeutically to nudge
the political branches into more serious engagement with these land
claims was informed by surrounding and contemporaneous public law
values, including those then attending active judicial extension of the
scope of administrative law. Given the state of Anglo-Commonwealth
public law during the 1970s and into the 1980s, and as I have often
observed elsewhere, 16 it would have been more surprising had
common-law Aboriginal title not appeared. Courts would have had to
explain why they were not extending public-law monitoring and
protection to one class of claimant-the tribes-while actively doing so
in many other spheres.
As it was, Calder was more the augury of a jurisprudence and pattern
of negotiated claims settlement that did not emerge (other than very
faintly) until more than 20 years later. During that time First Nations
were busier with the political route offered by the patriation package of
15 PG McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) [McHugh, Aboriginal Title].
16 See ibid at 5-6.
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the Trudeau government in 1982. Although last-minute provision had
been made for the recognition of "existing Aboriginal and treaty claims"
in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, " the mandated
Constitutional Conferences" nourished First Nations' hopes for forms
of political and constitutional renewal that were eventually dashed. The
Meech Lake (1987) and Charlottetown (1992) Accords as well as the
establishment in August 1991 of a Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (eventually to report in 1996'9) set reconciliation as a laudable
ideal, but ultimately this became no more than fruitless rhetoric.
By the mid-1990s, frustrated First Nations were returning to the
courts and leaning on the leverage suggested by section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. There had been an initial, scene-setting moment
in R v Sparrow,20 the first major case on section 35 where the Supreme
Court set out the means for prioritization of competing public and
private interests in the erection and administration of resource
management laws. Whilst the position in Sparrow on governmental
regulation and abridgement of Aboriginal rights was a weather vane for
the section 35 jurisprudence to come, the two important court
benchmarks of the 1990s were the possessory actions and tests set out in
the Van der Peet trilogy" (the rights test) and Delgamuukw (the title
test). By the mid-1990s the Supreme Court's docket was jammed with
First Nations cases. For all the judicial platitudes otherwise in Van der
Peet and Delgamuukw, possessory actions were then being based upon
the articulation and elaboration of legal principles that had been
17 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
s The record of these several conferences is set out online: Library of Parliament,
"Constitutional Conferences", online: <www.parl.gc.ca>.
19 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Communication
Group, 1996).
20 RvSparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385.
SR v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der Peet]; R v NTC
Smokehouse Ltd, [1996] 2 SCR 672, 137 DLR (4th) 528; R v Gladstone,
[1996] 2 SCR723, 137 DLR (4th) 648.
2015 801
UBC LAW REVIEW
accepted in Canadian law before the enactment of section 35 and that, in
the mid-1990s way of thinking anyway, had a conceptual life both
previous to and apart from it. Calder and Guerin set out principles of
possessory rights and a standard for Crown stewardship of Aboriginal
assets in cases commenced before section 35 "recognized and affirmed"
them. Though it carefully preserved "existing Aboriginal and treaty
rights", section 35 operated prophylactically. It was not designed to
provide the primary platform for title/rights possessory actions against
the Crown (much less to provide a framework for such actions) so much
as to provide protection from extinguishment. The same might be said
of section 223 of the Native Title Act 1993 in Australia, 22 passed in
response to the Mabo No 2 case.23 This statutory provision purported to
keep the common law as an independent generative source of native title
but, by a course of judicial interpretation, it became seen as the whole
platform. Something of the same trend appeared in the mid-1990s cases
and the Canadian jurisprudence's downplaying of the common-law
foundation for the title/rights possessory actions, although section 35
was not to take a fuller, replacing role until the next century. The brave
new legal world suggested in Calder, Guerin, and Mabo No 2 had turned
into something much less bold-indeed disfiguring as the critics of Van
der Peet pointed out.24
The Van der Peet test for Aboriginal rights (discussed more fully
below) quickly attracted adverse attention as ossifying those rights
"integral to a distinct culture" at the time of European contact. The test
literally involved travelling to an antique, pre-contact land. Within a
matter of weeks, a backtracking Supreme Court was distinguishing
between "title" and "rights".25 The Court later seemed to loosen the
rights test in Sappier; Gray with a "logical evolution" element, allowing
22 (Gth).
23 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA 23, 175 CLR 1.
24 See infa note 41 and accompanying discussion in text.
25 See R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101, 138 DLR (4th) 657; R v Ctd, [1996] 3 SCR
139, 138 DLR (4th) 385 (both judgments delivered in October 1996).
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the Aboriginal right to harvest wood for the construction of
temporary shelters to evolve into the present-day construction of
permanent dwellings.26
The title/rights distinction was hastily offered as an amelioration of
the botched-up rights test 27 and was elaborated by the Supreme Court
the next year in Delgamuukw. The Van der Peet test quickly became
problematic and awkward, if not embarrassing, as the judgment soon
after (the next day, in fact) in Pamajewon28 showed. In retrospect it was
the dissenting judgment of McLachlin J (as she then was) in Van der Peet
that signalled the new direction and invigoration of section 35 that was
to come in the new century. She joined the majority in the two October
judgments and in Delgamuukw, but she had laid the marker for the
load-bearing role that section 35 would soon acquire when she became
Chief Justice a week into 2000.29 Her approach in Van der Peet had gone
beyond the more narrow and straitening proprietary approach of the
majority. She saw section 35 as establishing constitutional Aboriginal
rights that could be of the common law, but that also transcended it so as
to grant rights that would provide a firm foundation for the settlement
of claims, were liberal and generous toward Aboriginal interests, and
considered claims in the context of the historic way of life of the people
asserting it. Above all, she insisted that the Court's approach had to be
true to the Crown's position as fiduciary for the first peoples.
The Supreme Court looked at Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw, but
the circumstances surrounding this first major reconsideration of its
26 R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 at paras 24-28, [2006] 2 SCR 686 [Sappier;
Gray]. The facts of this case were "hardly pushing the envelope" with a markedly
commercial edge to the "rights" claim: McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 15
at 136-37.
27 See Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?"
(1997) 36:1 Alta L Rev 117.
28 R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821, 138 DLR (4th) 204. This decision was handed
down on 22 August 1996, Van derPeeton 21 August 1996.
29 Beverley McLachlin replaced Antonio Lamer as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Canada on 7 January 2000.
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juridical foundations left ambiguities as to its nature. The case was
remitted for retrial due to the trial judge's failure to appreciate the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating Aboriginal claims. The
foundation of title in exclusive use and occupation was reaffirmed,30 a
position on which McLachlin J now joined the majority, leaving her
attempt in Van der Peet to found possessory rights in principles of the
continuity of legal systems upon a change of sovereignty. The case was
more significant for the Court distancing the title test from the criticized
aspects of the rights test. The majority indicated that Canadian
jurisprudence on Aboriginal title framed the "right to occupy and
possess" in broad terms and, significantly, was not qualified by the
restriction that use be tied to practice, custom, or tradition. The case left
open whether Aboriginal title was (to use terms that came into
widespread circulation) "territorial" (covering all land over which
claimants exercised territorial authority), "postage stamp" (limited to
those lands actually occupied), or "latticed" (a network of title patches
linked by threads of rights).
The conjoint appeal in Marshall; Bernard-` involved an appeal
against a criminal conviction in which Aboriginal title was pleaded as a
defence rather than as a substantive cause of action. The Supreme Court
intimated willingness to give the Delgamuukw title test of exclusivity a
loose quality. All that was required to prove the exclusivity associated
with title, said the majority, was demonstration of effective control of the
land by the group, from which a reasonable inference might be drawn
that the group could have excluded others had it chosen to do so. 32
Nonetheless, the Court was also clear that an appeal against criminal
conviction was not the opportune scenario for it to be delivering a
comprehensive judgment on the nature of Aboriginal title. That
opportunity finally came with Tsilhqot'in Nation, some 17 years
after Delgamuukw.
3 See Van der Peet, supra note 21 at para 41; Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 5 at para 25.
31 R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 [Marshall; Bernard].
32 See ibid at para 65.
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Meanwhile, under Chief Justice McLachlin's leadership the Supreme
Court seemed to be discarding the proprietary constraints of the
possessory actions for other new constitutional forms of action based on
section 35: notably, the duty to consult set out in Haida Nation3 3 and
the "honour of the Crown" in the Manitoba Metis Federation case." The
latter case showed that the courts would intervene (and write their own
version of history) in order to prod the Crown towards resolution of
historical (i.e., "specific"35) claims. Although this direction reflected the
character of the litigation coming before it, there was a wider feeling that
a form of jurisprudence that had its origins in a pre-section 35 era was
being replaced with a more consciously fashioned constitutional one.
Tsilhqot'in Nation indicates less that this perception was slightly
misplaced or premature, and more that the possessory actions would be
revitalized with the constitutional quality of this fresher jurisprudence.
The judgment in Tsilhqotin Nation was necessary for more pressing
reasons. The uncertainties that surrounded the Canadian cases on
Aboriginal title were hardly incentivizing progression of title claims at
the 100 negotiating tables across the country as of March 2014.36 There
have been six comprehensive claims settlements since 2006 (four of
which included provisions related to self-government),37 but this hardly
3 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister ofForests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR
511; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550.
Manitoba Meris Federation Inc v Canada, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 SCR 623 [MMF].
"Specific claims" is the term used to describe claims that raise past grievances of First
Nations related to Canada's obligations under historic treaties or the way it managed
First Nations'funds or other assets.
36 See Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Comprehensive
Claims', online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030577/1100100030578>.
3 The six comprehensive land claim agreements include several in British Columbia:
the Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement (2009); the five Maa-nulth First
Nations Final Agreement (2011); the Yale First Nation Final Agreement (2013); and
the Tla'amin Final Agreement (2014). Settlements also occurred in Quebec
(Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement (2008) and the Eeyou Marine Region Land
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represents a significant forward momentum. From the 1990s on,
Canadian courts spoke often of "reconciliation" and the need for
negotiated settlements whilst delivering judgments that did little to oil
those processes or to spur the political will onto settlement. Courts are
constrained by the form of action before them, of course, although the
imaginative approach of Justice Vickers at trial in Tsilhqot'in Nation3 1
(and in the result validated by the Supreme Court) may portend more
therapeutic judicial management of these cases less strictly constrained
by the pleadings. If the Supreme Court's judgment is to be seen as an
endorsement of Justice Vickers's interventionist judicial technique, it
would be one to be exercised watchfully in a field of litigation often
marked by a bucking proceduralism and recurrent evidentiary issues of
considerable cultural and juridical sensitivity, making trial hearings
protracted, fraught, and highly exposed. Whilst sympathizing with the
need for measures that expedite the political processes of claims
resolution, one worries that this path is perilous in that it relies upon the
calibre and experience-the nous-of the particular judge, and might
even become counter-productive. Not every trial judge has been as
vindicated (and as lionized) as Justice Vickers.3 9 Besides, not long ago in
the Lax Kw'laams Indian Band case the Supreme Court issued a
warning against the adoption of a "commission of inquiry" approach in
civil proceedings, even in First Nations cases where the procedural rules
Claims Agreement (2012)) and in Manitoba (e.g. the Sioux Valley Dakota Nation's
self-government agreement (2014)).
3' Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 CNLR 112.
3 The Supreme Court's correction of the trial judgment of MacEachern J in
Delgamuukw has been noted already. A recent example of this is the Court finding
"overriding and palpable errors" to have been made by the trial judge Sanderson J in
Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48 at para 40,
[2014] 2 SCR 447, aff'g 2013 ONCA 158, 114 OR (3d) 401, rev'g 2011 ONSC
4801, [2012] 1 CNLR 13. Overall, trial judges and counsel will get little
navigational guidance from the Supreme Court's position on the role of the trial
judge in First Nations' possessory actions.
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were to be generously interpreted to facilitate the resolution of the
underlying controversies in the public interest."
If the MMF case was intended to nudge and quicken the pace of
specific claims by making the "honour of the Crown" a present-day
juridical measure of past Crown conduct (and a vague, ahistorical one at
that), it might be that Tsilhqot'in Nation is attempting the same with
comprehensive (title) claims. Tsilhqotin Nation affirms a more
"territorial" model of title for land claims over the more restricting
postage stamp or "latticed" models; this development may be intended
to push provincial and federal governments toward a more generous
position on the geographical reach of title claims. Also, in giving title a
more territorial quality, the judgment could be seen as fostering a
provision for self-government in settlement negotiations without
actually undoing the Court's caginess and reluctance to extend section
35 to include this as an inherent right." Together, the Tsilhqot'in Nation
and MMF cases are suggestive. They implicitly signal that the Supreme
Court will be framing doctrine so as to address the inertia of
comprehensive and specific claims settlement processes. In short, the
Supreme Court has been deliberating with a weather eye on how the
political branches are faring with claims resolution. Unimpressed, seems
to be the verdict. This is a form of the juncture at which Calder was
handed down 40 years ago: a judicial corrective of political stasis. To
reanimate comprehensive claims settlement processes, it was necessary
for the Supreme Court to show that Aboriginal title was not merely a
spectral juridical possibility, but a viable juridical creature.
* Lax Kw'laams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56 at para 40,
[2011] 3 SCR 535 [Lax Kwalaams Indian Band].
* See e.g. Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 SCR 911. See also Kent McNeil,
EmergingJustice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) at 161-355 (where the
author tries to pump Aboriginal title into a territorial right of self-government).
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3. TIME (AND RETROACTIVITY) IN THE TEST FOR
ABORIGINAL TITLE: ABORIGINAL TITLE "WHERE
PRESENT OCCUPATION IS RELIED ON" VERSUS TITLE
CRYSTALLIZING "AT CROWN SOVEREIGNTY"
Now that the Supreme Court has finally induced Aboriginal title into a
live form, the elements that breathe life into it-its test-will become
more closely inspected as title claims surge back into the courts and onto
the negotiating tables in the renewed formatting suggested by the case.
The Tsilhqot'in Nation case reaffirmed the Delgamuukw test:
As we have seen, the Delgamuukw test for Aboriginal title to land is
based on "occupation" prior to assertion of European sovereignty. To
ground Aboriginal title this occupation must possess three
characteristics. It must be sufficient; it must be continuous (where present
occupation is relied on); and it must be exclusive.42
As is widely known and mentioned earlier, during the mid-1990s the
Supreme Court was required to articulate the juridical test(s) for the
pursuit of possessory actions against the Crown. In Delgamuukw Chief
Justice Lamer famously described these as occurring along the spectrum
from full exclusive title to site-specific, stand-alone rights in areas to
which Aboriginal access was not exclusive." The "Lamer spectrum"
divided between title/rights. "Title" conferred exclusive Aboriginal
possession, whilst the non-exclusive form could range from a bundle to
stand-alone site-specific "rights".
In August 1996, the Supreme Court articulated the rights test,
plainly intending it to be the test for all possessory forms. The Van der
Peet test for proof of an Aboriginal right required that the alleged
Aboriginal right be integral to the distinctive culture of the claimant
group's society. In order to be integral, a practice, custom, or tradition
must be of central significance to the society in question, with those
practices, customs, and traditions having continuity with the practices,
42 Tsilhqotin Nation, supra note 5 at para 25 [emphasis in original].
43 Delgamuukw, supra note 12 at para 138.
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customs, and traditions that existed prior to contact. The "frozen in
time" basis of the Aboriginal rights test received immediate and extensive
criticism.John Borrows's was amongst the most trenchant and telling:
With this test, as promised, ChiefJustice Antonio Lamer has now told
us what Aboriginal means. Aboriginal is retrospective. It is about what
was, "once upon a time," central to the survival of a community, not
necessarily about what is central, significant, and distinctive to the
survival of these communities today. His test has the potential to
reinforce troubling stereotypes about Indians."
In Sappier; Gray the Supreme Court thawed the test by allowing the
"logical evolution" of the right. Nonetheless and as the facts giving rise to
the Van der Peet trilogy showed, the Courts could still baulk at imbuing
those rights with a commercial element. In Lax Kw'alaams Indian Band,
the Court endorsed the trial judge's application of the Van der Peet test.
It agreed that on the facts the practices, customs, and traditions of the
pre-contact society did not provide an evidentiary springboard to a
constitutionally protected Aboriginal right to harvest and sell all varieties
of fish in a modern commercial fishery. The Lax Kw'alaams Band was
not a trading people in the pre-contact time period, except with respect
to eulachon grease. Its trade in other fish products was sporadic,
peripheral, and did not define what made the pre-contact society what it
was. The Court could not see how "natural evolution" could justify the
award of a quantitatively and qualitatively different right. There was, the
Court said (agreeing with the trial judge's worry) a "lack of continuity
John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indgenous Law (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 60. For other criticism from this time, see
Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van
derPeet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42:4 McGill LJ 993;
Leonard I Rotman, "Hunting for Answers in a Strange Kettle of Fish: Unilateralism,
Paternalism, and Fiduciary Rhetoric in Badger and Van der Peet" (1997) 8:2 Const
Forum Const 40; Michael Asch, "From Calder to Van der Peet: Aboriginal Rights
and Canadian Law, 1973-96" in Paul Havemann, ed, Indigenous Peoples'Rghts in
Australia, Canada, & New Zealand (Auckland, NZ: Oxford University
Press, 1999) 428.
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and proportionality in the Lax Kw'alaams' attempt to build a full-blown
twenty-first century commercial fishery on the narrow support of an
ancestral trade in eulachon grease"." The Supreme Court's recent (as of
2014) position in the Ahousaht litigation suggests that the cautiousness
towards acceptance of a commercial element might be eased by less
equivocal evidence in the pre-contact society.t Lurking in the Supreme
Court's approach is a continuity test beyond the Marshall; Bernard one
(continuity of the claimant group) and tending towards a version of the
Australian native title test, extending to continuity in the exercise and
nature of the right itself.
As also noted, the Delgamuukw test for title represented a swift, if
partial, curtailment of the severely constraining implications of the Van
der Peet test and the reductionist quest for integral elements predating
European contact. It has, however, taken until Tsilhqotin Nation for the
release of that manacle by way of a result that renders an actual title.
Nonetheless, though the delaying of that result might have been
attributable to the haphazard litigation-prone nature of common-law
development, there lies a hostage to fortune in the key cases of
Delgamuukw and Marshall Bernard where title was tantalized but not
served. This hostage remains captive in Tsilhqot'in Nation and it is one
that the Supreme Court at some stage may well have to pronounce dead,
smother, or set free.
The judgment in Tsilhqot'in Nation reminds us several times47 that
Aboriginal title crystallizes from occupation of land by the claimant
community at the assertion of Crown sovereignty. This was a case that
fell within the bracketed scenario of the Delgamuukw test, being one
"where present occupation [was] relied on" in order "to establish title at
45 Lax Kw'laams Indian Band, supra note 40 at para 8.
41 Ahousaht Indian Band and Ahousaht Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2009
BCSC 1494, [2010] 1 CNLR 1, aff'd 2011 BCCA 237, 2011 CSCR 353, aff'd
2013 BCCA 300, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34387 (30 January 2014).
47 Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 5 at paras 28, 30, 46-48, 50.
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the time of assertion of European sovereignty"."4 This "present
occupation" was the probative foundation for the title claim that had
also been made in Delgamuukw (remitted for retrial) and Marshall;
Bernard (unsuccessful challenge of a criminal conviction).
Some clarification of the nature of the present occupation test was
given in Marshall; Bernard. There the court explained that present
occupation required a measure of continuity from the present-day use
and occupation back to the moment or time of the assertion of European
sovereignty. This was demonstrated by showing the claimant group's
descent from the pre-sovereignty group whose practices are relied on for
the right. Continuity attached to the identity of the group rather than
to the nature of their occupation. In giving this continuity requirement
for a present-occupation title claim, the Court avoided a straightening or
narrow continuity test analogous to the High Court of Australia's
continuity test for native title. The Australian test encompasses
continuity to the present day both in the identity of the claimant group
and in their exercise as well as in the nature of the rights that comprise
their native title. In Australian jurisprudence this continuity turns on a
core notion of "tradition", the fulfillment of which has become a means
by which the scope of the native title has been limited. By this test, the
cognizability of any native title is drastically compromised where any
intervening pattern of occupation between Crown sovereignty and the
present has absorbed a non-traditional element as a result of colonial
contact. The Australian outcome has been a continuity test easier to
meet for groups that have lived far from the reach of white ways, and
vastly harder to meet for groups that have had to adapt perforce of
proximity to white settlement. The paradox then becomes that those
groups that have struggled with and made some necessary adaptation to
white neighbours and encroachment-those groups for whom
maintenance of cultural integrity has been more challenging-are
penalized in the application of a curtailing test that makes no allowance
" Ibid at para 50.
9 Marshall; Bernard, supra note 31 at paras 45-60, 70, 72.
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for any cultural resilience. 0 Happily the Supreme Court of Canadas
continuity test did not make such an implicit (and anthropologically
problematic-as well as culturally offensive) differentiation between
those groups with a pristine and authentic "tradition" and those with a
"creolized" and inauthentic one.
The captive possibility in the title test concerns the possibility of
proof of title not by reference to present-day occupation, but by proof of
title at the time of Crown sovereignty established by reference to past
occupation. Crown sovereignty is the moment at which that title is said
to "crystallize" at law. If by "crystallizing" the Court means that the title
then became enforceable in the Crown's courts and against it, then it is a
conclusion of considerable historical dubiousness. Though the shape of
what would become the common-law doctrine was forming in the early
20th century," it did not enter the legal mainstream until Calder. Rather,
the doctrine argues not that a title crystallizing at Crown sovereignty
could or should have been enforced against the Crown by its own courts
in the pre-Calder era, but that it can be enforceable now in a post-Calder
legal world that has come to include (especially in the McLachlin CJC
era) the judicial interpretation of section 35. This enforceability raises
little controversy in principle where the title is claimed by present
occupation. But does it also entail a title said to have crystallized at
Crown sovereignty being reinstated if there is sufficient historical
evidence from a previous time that can meet the Delgamuukw test of
effective control? Does Aboriginal title subsist in a cryonic state after its
factual expiry as to restore past occupation so much as protect present
and unexpired occupation? Is there a form of past-day Aboriginal title
where occupation at Crown sovereignty and other than at the present
5o See Simon Young's excellent analysis in The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and
Cultural Change (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008).
51 See Hamar Foster & Benjamin L Berger, "From Humble Prayers to Legal Demands:
The Cowichan Petition of 1909 and the British Columbia Indian Land Question" in
Hamar Foster, Benjamin L Berger & AR Buck, eds, The Grand Experiment: Law &
Legal Culture in British Settler Societies (Vancouver, BC: University of British
Columbia Press, 2008) 240.
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day other can be relied on and restored by a court (so displacing
subsequent long-term occupiers, including those under Crown grant)?
Kent McNeil certainly thinks so. As part of a collection on the
Temagami Blockade (1988-89) published in 2003, he wrote an essay
that picked up on this unexplored notion of an Aboriginal title at Crown
sovereignty proven by past rather than present occupation. The essay
raised the worrying implication of the restoration of a form of title that is
essentially spectral in the sense of it being unsupported by present use
and occupation but having existed at the time of Crown sovereignty. We
thus come to fundamental questions and uncertainties as to the function
of common-law Aboriginal title.
McNeil put the argument in favour of the restoration of a past-day
title with seductive simplicity:
[T]he fact remains that many Aboriginal people have been dispossessed,
either partially or completely, of their traditional lands. Are these
common law principles of any use where this has happened? The answer
must be yes, because any occupation of lands, including past occupation,
gives rise to the presumptions that the occupiers had possession and
hence title at the time. So if an Aboriginal people can show that they
occupied lands at any time after Crown assertion of sovereignty, the
presumption should be that they had possession and title. As pointed
out, the Crown could then try to rebut this presumption of Aboriginal
title by proving that the lands were unoccupied when it
asserted sovereignty.52
If the Crown cannot displace the factual foundation of the title claim
by proving non-occupation, it must move onto the legal argument that
the title was subsequently extinguished:
Failing that, the Crown might present evidence to show that Aboriginal
title had been surrendered or extinguished in the meantime, either by
treaty or by legislative taking. But once again, the burden of proving
52 Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title on the Ground: Establishing and Protecting
Occupation of Land" in Bruce W Hodgins, Ute Lischke & David T McNab, eds,
Blockades and Resistance: Studies in Actions of Peace and the Temagami Blockades of
1988-89 (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003) 147 at 153
[McNeil, "Aboriginal Title on the Ground"] [footnotes omitted].
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surrender or extinguishment would be on the Crown because Aboriginal
title, once proven to exist, is presumed to continue until shown to have
been surrendered or extinguished. 3
McNeil then delivers a rather stunningly casual moment of
blithe disregard for the implications of dispossessing innocent
present-day occupiers:
Moreover, a grantee of the Crown would have the same burden of proof
as the Crown itself because, if the Crown at the time the grant was
issued did not have more than the underlying title that it has to all
Aboriginal lands, the grant would be either null and void, or subject to
the Aboriginal title and hence to the Aboriginal titleholders' right to
exclusive use and occupation.
As usual with McNeil there is an abundance of case citation in his
footnotes and plentiful reference to his own work. By way of drawing on
an Australian native title analogy, he makes passing reference in a
footnote" to the Chippewas of Sarnia Band6 case: There the Ontario
Court of Appeal agreed with the first-instance court that present-day
occupiers of land could not be dispossessed by claims to an improperly
extinguished (and hence their title clouded by a subsisting) Aboriginal
title. McNeil cites his "critique" of this case as though that alone were
sufficient to discredit its authority, but overlooks the not-unimportant
refusal twice by the McLachlin Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal
5 Ibid [footnotes omitted].
5 Ibid. McNeil does not engage the literature on this, notably Jeremy Waldron's
sequence of essays: "Superseding Historic Injustice" (1992) 103:1 Ethics 4;
"Redressing Historic Injustice" (2002) 52:1 UTLJ 135; "Indigeneity? First Peoples
and Last Occupancy" (2003) 1 NZ J Public & Intl L 55; "Settlement, Return and
the Supersession Thesis" (2004) 5:2 Theor Inq Law 237.
5 McNeil, "Aboriginal Title on the Ground', supra note 52 at 266-67, n 49.
56 Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 51 OR (3d) 641,
195 DLR (4th) 135 (CA), aff'g 40 RPR (3d) 49, [1999] OJ No 1406 (QL) (Sup
CtJ) [Sarnia].
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(2001 and 2002)." This refusal suggests that the possibility of a past-day
Aboriginal title is juridically dead at least as against third-party
titleholders of the Crown. Whilst that is not to exclude other forms of
court action that establish Crown accountability, such as that in MMF,
actions to recover possession of lost lands from third parties based upon
a subsisting past-day Aboriginal title may be doomed notwithstanding
McNeil's advocacy otherwise.
McNeil is drawing out the implications of the Aboriginal title test's
parenthetical reference to proof based on present occupation and the
possibility discussed by former chief justice Lamer in Delgamuukw and
reaffirmed in Tsilhqot'in Nation that past occupation could theoretically
result in valid title. But momentarily disregarding the Supreme Court's
contradictory unwillingness to brook the possibility its judgments still
seem to be incubating, we might ask more generally if common-law
Aboriginal title is really a doctrine to validate what are essentially
historical (specific) claims. In all the major cases except the ill-fated
Sarnia case, the doctrine has been invoked to validate extant possessory
rights. As a legal argument it was conceived in situations to protect what
was there and had been there since Crown sovereignty, not to restore
that which had been lost in the meantime, however colourable and
impugnable those historical processes of loss. Aboriginal title was
designed to protect Aboriginal rights and interests such as the
indigenous habitat in the Australian outback from bauxite extraction,
the indigenous habitat in northern Quebec from low-flying NATO jets
and hydro projects, indigenous fishing and hunting rights in the prairies
and the Laurentian peneplain, and Maori fishing rights around the New
Zealand coastline. Its goals initially were preservative, not restorative.
Though the title might have crystallized at Crown sovereignty, it was
born essentially as a possessory action to protect rights that remained in
the actual exercise. The companion doctrine of Crown fiduciary duty to
First Nations' occupants, as it appeared in the 1980s, was aimed not at
5 Ibid, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 28365 (8 November 2001). The Chippewas
filed for a reconsideration of the application for leave and this was also declined
(13 June 2002).
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protecting extant possessory rights but at establishing standards of
Crown accountability for their treatment. If the possessory action is
going to be given the retroactive effect that the Supreme Court
judgments have been harbouring, then there will need to be clear
juridical explanation for this enlargement of the scope of Aboriginal title.
The jurisprudential course of development in the new century
revised the proprietary orientation towards a more public law and fluid
approach, one that looked towards the conduct of governmental
relations with First Nations rather than more rigidifying questions of
ownership. There was a clear need for a jurisprudential course that was
more constitutionally expressive (and which the McLachlin Supreme
Court's awakening of section 35 enabled) and less boxed in by the
constraining proprietary paradigm of Aboriginal title/rights and, to a
lesser extent, the fiduciary doctrine. And given that possessory actions
remain a necessity, especially for the advancement of comprehensive
claims processes, there was no doubt that the incompleteness of the title
formulations in Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard needed attention
and something of the corrective given in Tsilhqor'in Nation.
Nevertheless, read alongside MMF, unsatisfactorily open ends remain
surrounding the feasibilities of pursuing historical (specific) claims
through adjudicative processes.
McNeil presumed that the pursuit of specific claims through the
courts by the sculpting of common-law proprietary principles would be
an unproblematic strategy, likewise the granting of proprietary remedies.
Even if (contra Sarnia) a past-day title possibility remains viable in
Canadian law (as Tsilhqot'in Nation seems to have notionally kept open),
it may be that courts will later smother it with heavy probative
requirements. That is, the standard of evidence for proof of occupation
at the time of Crown sovereignty might be set at so high a threshold as to
become impossible to achieve. It would also require expert evidence of
an anthropological and historical character that would be costly and take
a long while to assemble only to be characterized by a court as
insufficient to satisfy the legal test of effective (historical) occupation.
Some might think it were better such an exercise, with all the resourcing
that it would require (and drain) were never attempted in court.
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The Australian version of Aboriginal title excludes the possibility
that Canadian law continues to murkily harbor and that Tsilhqotin
Nation could have usefully removed. In Australia, to establish native title
there must be continuity not only of the claimant group itself, but also of
their use and occupation of the claimed land since Crown sovereignty.
Native title is thus a possessory right grounded in extant use and
occupation. In Canada it seems also possibly to be a historical artifact
that might be revived.
The New Zealand position also offers a useful comparison. A few
weeks after Tsilhqot'in Nation was handed down, the New Zealand
Supreme Court issued its judgments in Paki v Attorney-General." In this
case the New Zealand Supreme Court rejected the appellants' arguments
that the Crown owed a fiduciary duty in relation to its 19th-century
purchase of particular Maori land,5 9 although the Court left open the
possibility that such a duty might arise in future cases.60 Unlike the
Supreme Court of Canada (by implication in Tsilhqot'in Nation and
directly in MMF), New Zealand's highest court has shown a distinct
reluctance to be drawn into the processes attending the resolution of
historical claims. These processes occur inside a political realm where
"treaty partners"4 negotiate and forge agreement, a Kiwi version of
5 PakivAttorney-General(No 2), [2014] NZSC 118, [2015] 1 NZLR67 [Paki].
5 See PG McHugh, "The Legal Basis of Maori Claims Against the Crown" (1988) 18
VUWLR 1 (in New Zealand, the argument that limitations and laches did not run
in relation to actions for Crown breach of fiduciary duty to Maori). The Canadian
position is that the Crown can rely upon statutory limitation periods. See e.g.
Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 SCR 245; Sarnia, supra
note 56. The exception is for actions seeking declaratory relief in relation to the
constitutionality (a broadly applied notion) or otherwise of Crown action. See e.g.
MMF, supra note 34.
6o Paki, supra note 58 at paras 187-89.
61 This terminology was invoked in the famous Maori Council series of cases of the
late 1980s: New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, [1987] 1 NZLR
641, [1987] 6 NZAR 353 (CA); Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General,
[1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA); Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General,
[1990] 2 NZLR 641 (CA). See also Rt Hon Robin Cooke, "The Challenge of
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Canada's nation-to-nation setting. There is no clearer expression of the
reason for this reluctance than Justice Young's statement that retroactive
application of fiduciary doctrine "if accepted, would result in the
examination of 19th century transactions through a 21st century lens,
with a resulting risk of distortion."62 While New Zealand does not have
the equivalent of section 35, Canadians will note the reluctance of its
courts to be drawn into litigation that addresses historical claims on
grounds of the distortion of historical events that a contemporary
juridical enquiry would seem to invite. 3
Treaty of Waitangi Jurisprudence" (Harkness Henry Lecture delivered at the
University of Waikato, Hamilton, NZ, 24 September 1994), (1994) 2 Waikato L
Rev 1 at 10, n 27:
[t]he first Muriwhenua judgment also led to an exchange rather out of the ordinary. In her
Waitangi Day speech in 1990 Her Majesty the Queen had quoted some words from the first
Maori Council case about partnership and the utmost good faith. She built on these words in
a way referred to in the Muriwhenua judgment . . . and there was some consequent
correspondence.
See also Joe Williams, "Future Directions" in Jacinta Ruru, ed, In Good Faith:
Symposium Proceedings Marking the 20th Anniversary ofthe Lands Case (Otago, NZ:
University of Otago, 2008) 121 at 127. Kendal Luskie summarizes Williams's
argument as follows:
[T]he Court of Appeal's description of the Crown-Maori relationship as being akin to
partnership is empowering to Maori, and such a description would not be used to define the
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous peoples by the top courts in Australia, the
United States or Canada [where First Nations self-determination is not judicially recognised
as a right encompassed by section 35]:
The Relationship between the New Zealand Crown and Maori: A Future for Fiduciary
Obligations? (LLB (Honours) Dissertation, University of Otago Faculty of Law,
2010) [unpublished] at 55, n 362.
62 Paki, supra note 58 at para 309. See also ibid at para 192 (on using common-law or
equitable means to disrupt claims settlement processes encompassed in statute;
strictly speaking, this observation needs qualification to the extent that historical
treaty claims can and have been resolved by extra-statutory direct negotiation rather
than statutory Waitangi Tribunal processes).
6' This reluctance has encompassed not only substantive adjudication upon historical
claims (which Maori claims to remnant rights around the coastline were not), but
also to the more usual administrative law procedural grounds of intervention. See
Jessica Andrew, "Administrative Review of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement
Process" (2008) 39:2 VUWLR 225; David V Williams, "Wi Parata is Dead, Long
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There are other related questions of retroactivity inhabiting the
Tsilhqot'in Nation judgments alongside the questions I have identified
with respect to what I have termed "past-day title". It concerns those
exercising rights (such as mineral or lumbering) granted by the Crown
over land that has become amenable to an Aboriginal title claim similar
to that in Tsilhqotin Nation. The majority judgment includes obiter that
signals a possible line of jurisprudential development and which has
raised concerns for resource developers about a "retroactive 'veto."1
These concerns arise from paragraph 92 of the judgment, as follows:
Once title is established, it may be necessary for the Crown to reassess
prior conduct in light of the new reality in order to faithfully discharge
its fiduciary duty to the title-holding group going forward. For example,
if the Crown begins a project without consent prior to Aboriginal title
being established, it may be required to cancel the project upon
establishment of the title if continuation of the project would be
unjustifiably infringing. Similarly, if legislation was validly enacted
before title was established, such legislation may be rendered
inapplicable going forward to the extent that it unjustifiably infringes
Aboriginal title."
Whatever may eventuate from further judicial amplification of the
consequences of an established aboriginal title, one expects Tsilhqot'in
Nation will give momentum to the comprehensive claims processes. My
comment here is that it keeps a door slightly ajar for the possibility of the
pursuit of a certain type of specific claim in the courts. Canadian courts
continue to misleadingly treat common-law Aboriginal title as though it
were both a historical legal reality and a late-20th century judicial
contrivance. It is, of course, almost entirely the latter-and an important
one at that. Tsilhqot'in Nation is an important stage in the life of that
contemporary doctrine, but one rather wishes for a clearer
Live Wi Parata" in Andrew Erueti & Claire Charters, eds, Maori Property Rights and
the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier (Wellington, NZ: Victoria University of
Wellington University Press, 2007) at 36.
6' Pratt & Smithernan, supra note 13.
65 Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 5 at para 92.
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characterization from Canadian courts of common-law Aboriginal title
as a means for the protection of extant use and occupation. It is
a possessory action grounded in a title that subsists today from
First Nations' continued use and occupation. It is cognizable because that
title is manifest today, not because it technically crystallized at Crown
sovereignty. The function of the doctrine is to vigorously protect rights
that remain in the actual exercise, not to revive, in possessory form, rights
that have been lost by colourable historical processes such as usurpation
or improper extinguishment.
